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The Desirability of a Statute for the
Enforcement of Mediated Agreements
MERTON C. BERNSTEIN*
A statute governing the enforcement of mediated agreements is
desirable in order to encourage the use of mediation; a statute is
indispensable in order to resolve questions concerning proper mediation
procedure.
Professor Burns' paper is undoubtedly correct in asserting that the
common law provides many standards to govern the enforceability of
contracts, both non-mediated and mediated. As a general rule, the
enforceability of mediated agreements should be determined by those
common law principles as modified by applicable statutes such as the
Uniform Commercial Code.' However, special procedural rules, codified
by statute, are needed to increase the utility of mediated agreements.2
Contrary to Professor Burns' focus, the purpose of many mediated
agreements is to resolve outstanding differences, rather than to govern
future party relationships. Hence, some mediated agreements are ready
for enforcement and are susceptible to entry as judgments. For these
settlement agreements, a specific summary procedure available for the
enforcement by motion, similar to the procedure available for the
enforcement of arbitration awards under the Federal Arbitration Act
and all state statutes, may be desirable. The availability of rapid and
easy enforcement procedures in the mediation context can encourage
the use of mediation as a means of settling disputes when, for example,
the parties are concerned about the continued availability of assets to
satisfy the settlement terms, or the parties have some misgivings about
the other parties' continued willingness or ability to perform as promised.
However, a party with a claim may see no advantage to a mediated
settlement if the mediation procedures are subject to the usual delays
inherent in litigation.
In addition, a statute which codifies the enforceability of mediated
agreements would force the legal community to recognize the validity
of the mediation process. Imposing a statutory process on mediation
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1. Modem arbitration statutes provide a model. They provide enforceability of agree-
ments to arbitrate unless legal or equitable grounds exist for revocation, for example.
Uniform Arbitration Act, § I. Such provisions were urged and adopted to overcome
common law doctrines permitting revocation with impunity before award. Statutory dec-
larations of the validity and enforceability of mediated agreements are desirable for
different reasons.
2. See Note, Enforceability of Mediated Agreements, 1 OHio ST. J. Dis. REs. 385
(1986), for examples of mediated agreement situations which present enforcement questions
in which common law principles alone do not supply a complete answer. Where circum-
stances peculiar to mediated agreements occur, they may require specially tailored principles
which statutes can most readily supply.
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activities might overcome the general reluctance of lawyers to use any
new approach which contains unfamiliar procedures and doctrines. Fur-
ther, the enactment of a statute adds a certain dignity and respectability
to the use of mediation by lawyers.
Aside from considerations of utility and convenience, mediation pre-
sents several unique ethical problems which require legislative resolution.
For example, questions arise as to whether a lawyer/mediator may or
should offer the parties legal advice. The solution necessary to satisfy
norms of attorney responsibility is to require the mediator to refer the
parties to their own counsel. While referral is the more ethical alternative,
one objection to this alternative is that the financially weaker party
may lack effective access to counsel and would be disadvantaged by
the insistence upon such a procedure.
Some courts might well find that a mediator's action in purporting
to give legal advice to both parties fatally flaws the resulting agreement.
Other courts may tip the balance in favor of convenience by finding
this giving of advice to be justified as a means of encouraging dispute
mediation. Still others may look to the overall context, including the
resources of the parties, the relationship of the attorney with either or
both parties, whether the legal problem may prevent an agreement, and
whether some statute or doctrine gives one party protection which an
unrepresented party might not use fully or at all. The possibilities are
many and varied, but most can be anticipated if the accumulated
experience of mediators and lawyers specializing in these difficult areas
are pooled.
The American Bar Association and others have promulgated codes
of ethics to cover difficult mediation situations.3 However, the status of
these codes, which often differ concerning key provisions, is far from
settled. Some courts may regard them as norms which must be observed;
others may treat them as desirable but nonbinding expressions of goals.
Legislation could provide the answer by making mandatory those pro-
visions deemed desirable or modifications of those provisions.
4
3. See generally, ABA Standards of Practice for Lawyer Mediators in Family Disputes.
Appendix I, ABA Divorce Mediation: Readings.
4. Other common ethical and practical problems require resolution. In community
disputes, for example, the inclusion of all affected groups in the mediation process is
desirable. Yet powerful groups with adverse interests may well resist their inclusion in
the mediation of a dispute. That insistence may place the mediator in a dilemma as to
whether to proceed despite the particular group's absence. If the mediator raises the
question or declines to proceed, his or her neutrality may come into question. Insistence
upon inclusion of the absent group may appear as advocacy, an impression damaging or
fatal to the process. If, however, a statute requires the inclusion of all groups with a
substantial interest as a condition of enforceability, parties otherwise disposed to excluding
weaker parties will be required by law to include them.
This is but one example of how statutes can help relieve the mediator from the onus
of raising troublesome questions which might be interpreted as advocacy of another group's
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ENFORCEMENT OF MEDIATED AGREEMENTS
Unlike adjudication, legislation can do more than merely choose
between competing interests on a case by case basis. Nor are legislatures
limited, as are the courts, by restrictive procedures. Specifically, leg-
islatures have the flexibility to structure and fund services needed to
make mediation work, and work fairly.'
The alternative advocated by Professor Burns is to let the courts sort
out the problems, standards, and remedies in the common law fashion.
Waiting for a body of case law doctrine to develop strikes me as
eminently undesirable. In this relatively new field, counsel often will be
unready to offer courts the guidance, alternatives, and justifications
needed for fully reasoned choice. Judges will vary enormously in their
conversancy with mediation and will often know less about its potential
and problems than legislative committees acting upon the recommen-
dations of experts. (The procedures used to formulate the Uniform
Commercial Code might serve as a model.) Meanwhile, mediators,
lawyers, and perplexed parties will be forced to operate in a state of
uncertainty while the common law slowly unfolds.6 Judges' opinions will
almost certainly provoke as much confusion as clarity while the courts
slowly create standards. 7
In this emerging area of law, we ought to acknowledge that the
courts are severely limited in their ability to fashion coherent and
comprehensive new doctrine. Only the legislatures are equipped to
analyze and synthesize the diversity of concerns and viewpoints which
exist regarding mediation. In this new area of the law, we need the
certainty which only statutory laws can provide.
claims. Such statutes might also enable the mediator to focus upon facilitating negotiations
as well as sparing the mediator the duty of instructing the parties.
5. For example, the legislature might enact legislation requiring the state to supply
legal counsel to mediation participants who have significant legal problems which would
affect the fairness of a mediated agreement.
6. Those of us familiar with the problems of preemption in labor relations law have
been waiting for the definitive answers from the courts since the late 1940s. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly issued utterances on the subject which sometimes appear to settle
matters, only to have later opinions unsettle them. Those who seek definitive answers
from the courts often find themselves waiting for Godot.
7. This predilection for the common law over statute tells us something about some
shortcomings of legal education. Law school preoccupation with what the courts do obscures
for students, our present and future lawyers, the fact that most law is made by legislators
and administrators, with only occasional intervention by the courts.
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